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Abstract
This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown
quality to an evaluator, who decides whether or not to accept it. First, we show that there exist
instances where an agent with a better track record of producing high-quality projects should
be subjected to more stringent standards. Second, we show that an increase in the submission
fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its e¤ects
on the evaluators acceptance policy.
JEL Classication: D02, D82, L50.
Keywords: Evaluation, Project Screening, Regulatory Burden.
E-mail : andreibarbos@gmail.com; Address : 4202 East Fowler Ave, BSN 3403, Tampa, FL 33620-5500; Phone :
813-974-6514; Fax : 813-974-6510; Website : http://sites.google.com/site/andreibarbos/
1 Introduction
We study a game of two-sided incomplete information in which an agent considers proposing a
project to an evaluator, who has the choice of whether or not to accept it. Each player learns a
private informative signal about the quality of the project, while the available public information
translates into a common prior. The agents payo¤upon submission is determined by the evaluators
decision. The evaluators payo¤ is determined by the quality of the projects that he accepts. Making
the proposal incurs a monetary or non-monetary submission fee on the agent.
The situations that are captured by the above setting are abundant and diverse. A possible
example is that of a rm interested in undertaking a project, such as the development of an
economic activity in an environmentally sensitive area, that requires ling a costly application with
a regulatory agency. In this case, the rm is concerned with the agencys decision of whether
to approve the proposal, while the regulatory agency is usually concerned with the social welfare
implications of that activity.1
A rst nding in this setup relates a change in the common prior with the equilibrium strategy
of the evaluator. We identify the condition under which the evaluator becomes less stringent in his
acceptance policy when the prior about the agent is higher. This condition is not always satised
and therefore, an agent with a higher prior, such as one with a better reputation of producing
high-quality projects, may need to face more stringent requirements.
We then investigate the e¢ ciency e¤ects of a change in the submission fee. Leslie (2005) con-
siders a model of one-sided incomplete information, in which the evaluator can perfectly assess the
quality of a submitted project, and shows that submission fees and time delays at academic journals
increase the quality of papers submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. In our
model, a higher submission fee also increases the quality of projects that the agent submits, but this
induces the evaluator to lower his standards of acceptance and therefore to accept projects with less
favorable private signals. We identify the condition under which, on net, a higher submission fee
increases the expected quality of projects that are implemented. Since this condition is not always
satised, it is possible for a higher submission fee to lower the expected quality of these projects.
Thus, in a model with two-sided incomplete information in which the evaluators assessment of
the project is imperfect, we show that by accounting for the evaluators response to an increase in
the quality of projects submitted by the agent, higher submission fees can decrease the quality of
projects that are implemented.2
The closest paper to ours is Taylor and Yildirim (2011), which studies a model in which an agent
chooses the amount of e¤ort to exert in generating a project, and investigates the moral hazard
1Other examples are the introduction of a new product with potential undesirable e¤ects, a merger, a patent
application, or the submission of an article to an academic journal.
2Cotton (2012) shows that moderate submission fees and delays are optimal when authors are heterogenous with
respect to willingness to pay submission fees and deal with delays.
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e¤ects of the potentially available public information. Ottaviani and Wickelgren (2009) analyze the
trade-o¤ between ex-ante and ex-post approval of an activity when the evaluator may reconsider
his approval at the time when the quality of the project is revealed. Boleslavsky and Cotton (2011)
study a model in which an evaluator has to select one of several competing proposals, and investigate
the e¤ect of the limited capacity on the incentives of the proposers to produce information.
2 The Model
There are two players, an agent (A) and an evaluator (E). A owns a project and considers proposing
it to E . The project is of either high (h) or low (l) quality. The common prior probability of h is 0.
An accepted project yields A a payo¤ 1, irrespective of its ex-post observed quality. Submitting the
project incurs a fee on A whose monetary equivalent is c 2 (0; 1). As payo¤ from not submitting
the project is 0. Upon receiving a project from A, E has the choice of whether to accept it or not.
Es payo¤ from accepting a high-quality project is 1, while his loss from accepting a low-quality
project is L 2 (0; 1). Es payo¤ from rejecting a project is normalized to 0.3
Prior to taking their decisions, A and E perform assessments of the project that result in a
subjective evaluation of its quality.4 As assessment yields a private signal  2 [0; 1]; Es assessment
yields a private signal  2 [0; 1]. For quality q 2 fh; lg, Gq() and F q() denote the cumulative
distribution functions of As and Es signals, respectively, and gq() > 0 and f q() > 0 are the
corresponding density functions. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (i) gq and f q are bounded and twice continuously di¤erentiable for q 2 fh; lg; (ii)
d
d
h
fh()
f l()
i
> 0, dd
h
gh()
gl()
i
> 0; (iii) lim
!0
gh()
gl()
= 0 and lim
!1
gh()
gl()
=1
Part (ii) of the assumption is the usual monotone likelihood ratio. Part (iii) imposes that for
extreme signals of E , information becomes almost perfect.
3 The Equilibrium
Consider some arbitrary strategies of A and E , respectively, ag : [0; 1]! fs; ng and ev : [0; 1]!
fa; rg, with the obvious interpretation of the action labels. A submits a project of quality signal 
if and only if
Pr(fagj)  1  c  0() Pr(fagj)  c (1)
3The analysis does not change in a meaningful way if the agents payo¤ also depends on the quality of the project
or if the evaluator is also concerned with the quality of projects that he rejects. Since the submission fee may often
take a non-monetary form, we do not include it in the evaluators payo¤.
4 In the case of an application for economic development in a environmentally sensitive area, both the rm and
the regulatory agency can acquire private information through expert analysis about the likelihood that the activity
is welfare improving, while, for instance, the rms environmental record is public information.
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where the event fag  f 2 [0; 1] : ev () = ag. E accepts a submitted project if and only if
Pr(hjfsg; )  1 + [1  Pr(hjfsg; )] ( L)  0() Pr(hjfsg; )  L
1 + L
(2)
where fsg  f 2 [0; 1] : ag () = sg.
The next lemma, whose proof is in the online appendix A1, states that in any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, the two players adopt cuto¤ strategies with respect to their informative signals.
Lemma 3.1 Any equilibrium of the game is characterized by two values (; ) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1],
such that A submits a project if and only if    and E accepts it if and only if   .
Therefore, a players equilibrium strategy can be dened in terms of the corresponding cuto¤.
For the rest of the paper, s and s will denote generic cuto¤ strategies of the two players,  (s)
and  (s) will denote best responses, while  and  will refer to equilibrium strategies.
The next lemma describes the two playersbest responses. Its proof is in appendix A2.
Lemma 3.2 (i)There exist two thresholds 1; 2 2 (0; 1), with 1 < 2, such that A submits a
project if and only if    (s) 2 [0; 1], where: (1)  (s) = 0, for s 2 [0; 1]; (2)  (s) is dened
implicitly by
0
1  0
gh()
gl()
=
c  1  F l (s)
[1  F h (s)]  c (3)
when s 2 (1; 2); and (3)  (s) = 1, for s 2 [2; 1].
(ii) E accepts a project if and only if    (s), where  (s) is dened implicitly by
0
1  0
fh()
f l()
1 Gh(s)
1 Gl(s)
= L (4)
In (4), 1 G
h(s)
1 Gl(s) is the likelihood of h as inferred by E from the fact that A submitted the
proposal. Therefore, E accepts a proposal if and only if the likelihood of h, as inferred by E from
the prior

0
1 0

, his informative signal

fh()
f l()

, and the fact that A submitted the proposal
1 Gh(s)
1 Gl(s)

, exceeds L. On the other hand, (3) states that A submits a proposal if and only if
the likelihood of h, as inferred by A from the prior and from his informative signal, exceeds the
corresponding ratio between the expected loss when the project is of low-quality,
 
c  1  F l (s),
and the expected benet when it is of high quality,
 
1  F h (s)
  c.5
The two best-response functions and the equilibrium are depicted in panel (a) of Figure 1.
5c  1  F l (s) is the expected loss from submitting a project of low quality as it is the di¤erence between the
submission cost c and the expected benet

1  F l (s)
  1.
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The next proposition states the existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium; its
proof is in appendix A3.
Proposition 1 As best response  (s) is increasing. Es best response  (s) is decreasing. There
exists a unique equilibrium of the game, (; ), with  2 [0; 1) and  2 (0; 1).
4 Results
The rst comparative statics of interest are with respect to the two playersrelative costs of their
respective actions, L and c.
Proposition 2 (i) d

dL > 0,
d
dL > 0; (ii)
d
dc > 0,
d
dc < 0.
When L increases, the right hand side of (4) increases, and thus the curve  (s) shifts to the
right. Since  (s) remains unchanged, this leads to an increase in both  and . Intuitively,
if L increases, the incentive for E to accept a project decreases, and this induces an increase in
. Anticipating a more stringent acceptance policy by E , A exerts more project screening and
increases . Second, when c increases, the curve  (s) stays xed. Taking the derivative of the
right hand side of (3) with respect to c, and using the fact that F l (s) > F h (s),6 it follows that
the curve  (s) moves up. This leads to a decrease in  and an increase in . Thus, when c
increases, A exerts more project screening and increases . Knowing this, E increases his belief
about the quality of projects that he receives, and lowers .
Next, we examine the e¤ect of a change in 0 on the equilibrium strategies. Note that when 0
increases, the values of  and  that satisfy equations (3) and (4), respectively, decrease. Thus, as
depicted in panel (b) of Figure 1, both best-response curves shift down.  therefore unequivocally
6The monotone likelihood property in assumption 1(ii) implies stochastic dominance.
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decreases: an agent who is ex-ante more likely to produce a high-quality project is more condent
in submitting marginal projects. The change in  is ambiguous, as the direct e¤ect on beliefs of
the higher 0 can be o¤set by the decrease in posterior beliefs generated by As strategy.  will
decrease if Es strategy is more elastic with respect 0 than with respect to As strategy.
Proposition 3 We have: (i) d

d0
< 0; (ii) d

d0
< 0 if and only if dd ln
gh()
gl() >
d
d ln
1 Gh()
1 Gl() .
Proof. Part (i) follows from the preceding argument. For (ii), writing (3) and (4) in equilibrium,
dividing them, and taking logarithms, we obtain
ln

gh()
gl()

  ln

1 Gh()
1 Gl()

= ln

1
L
fh()
f l()

+ ln
 
c  1  F l ()
[1  F h ()]  c
!
(5)
The term in the right hand side of (5) is increasing in .7 Since d

d0
< 0, it follows that d

d0
< 0
if and only if the term in the left hand side of (5) is increasing in . 
Thus, E becomes more lenient if the elasticity of the likelihood of h as inferred fromAs threshold
signal  is higher than the elasticity of the likelihood of h as inferred by E from the fact that A
submitted the project. It can be shown by counterexample that the condition in proposition 3(ii)
is not always satised. This suggests that there exist instances where an agent with a better track
record of producing high-quality projects should be subjected to more stringent standards.
Next, we investigate the e¤ect of an increase in c on the expected quality of projects that are
implemented, which as is isomorphic with Pr (hj  ;   ).8
Proposition 4 ddc Pr (hj  ;   ) > 0 if and only if dd ln f
h()
f l() >
d
d ln
1 Fh()
1 F l() .
Proof. By BayesRule, we have
Pr (hj  ;   ) = Pr (  
;   jh) Pr(h)
Pr (  ;   jh) Pr(h) + Pr (  ;   jl) Pr(l)
=
0
0 + (1  0) Pr(;jl)Pr(;jh)
=
0
0 +
1 0
1 Gh()
1 Gl()
1 Fh()
1 Fl()
where we used the conditional independence of the two playerssignals. Therefore, Pr (hj  ;   )
increases if and only if ln 1 G
h()
1 Gl() + ln
1 Fh()
1 F l() increases. From (4), we have ln
1 Gh()
1 Gl() =
7The formal proof of the fact that
c [1 F l()]
[1 Fh()] c is increasing in 
, for  2 (1; 2), is presented in appendix A2.
8The expected quality of the projects that are implemented is l + (h  l) Pr (hj  ;   ).
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lnL   ln 01 0   ln
fh()
f l() , so Pr (hj  ;   ) increases if and only if ln
1 Fh()
1 F l()   ln
fh()
f l()
increases. Since  is decreasing in c, the proof of the proposition is complete. 
The condition in proposition 4 is not always satised, and thus, while a higher submission fee
always increases the expected quality of projects that are received for review (as elicited by the
increase in ), it may lead to an inferior equilibrium outcome by lowering the evaluators standards
of acceptance to an extent that more than o¤sets the increase in the quality of projects that are
submitted.9 On the other hand, when the condition in proposition 4 is satised, the e¢ ciency of
the outcome can be improved by increasing c and shifting the project-screening onto the agent.
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Appendix (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Appendix A1. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Consider some arbitrary strategy ag of A. Then, for Es beliefs, by BayesRule we have
Pr(hjfsg; ) = j(fsg; jh) Pr(h)
j(fsg; jh) Pr(h) + j(fsg; jl) Pr(l) (6)
where j(j) denotes the conditional probability density function of the relevant continuous random
variable. Since As action and the signal  are conditionally independent, it follows that
Pr(hjfsg; ) = Pr(fsgjh)f
h()0
Pr(fsgjh)fh()0 + Pr(fsgjl)f l() (1  0) (7)
=
Pr(fsgjh) 01 0
fh()
f l()
Pr(fsgjh) 01 0
fh()
f l()
+ Pr(fsgjl)
Since, the last term in (7) is increasing in f
h()
f l()
, the fact that dd
h
fh()
f l()
i
> 0, as imposed by
assumption 1, implies dd Pr(hjfsg; ) > 0. Thus, given (2), for any ag, E responds with a cuto¤
strategy by accepting a submitted project if and only if   (ag), with (ag) 2 [0; 1].
On the other hand, given some arbitrary strategy ev of E , for As belief we have
Pr(fagj) = Pr(fagj; h) Pr(hj) + Pr(fagj; l) Pr(lj)
= [Pr(fagjh)  Pr(fagjl)] Pr(hj) + Pr(fagjl) (8)
where the second equality follows from the fact that  is redundant forAs inference about Es action
when conditioning on the quality of the project. Since in any equilibrium, E uses a cuto¤ strategy,
we have Pr(fagjh)   Pr(fagjl) = Pr(  jh)   Pr(  jl) = F l()   F h(). The monotone
likelihood ratio property implies rst order stochastic dominance, and thus F l() F h() > 0. On
the other hand, by BayesRule we have
Pr(hj) = g
h()0
gh()0 + gl() (1  0) =
gh()
gl()
0
1 0
gh()
gl()
0
1 0 + 1
(9)
which is increasing in g
h()
gl()
, and thus increasing in  since dd
h
gh()
gl()
i
> 0 by assumption 1. There-
fore, when E employes a cuto¤ strategy, dd Pr(fagj) > 0, and thus As best response is a cuto¤
strategy. 
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Appendix A2. Proof of Lemma 3.2
(i) Given an arbitrary cuto¤ strategy s of E , we have Pr(fagjq) = Pr(  sjq) = 1 F q (s), for
q 2 fh; lg. Employing lemma 3.1 and (9) in Pr(fagj) = Pr(fagjh) Pr(hj) + Pr(fagjl) Pr(lj), it
follows that
Pr(fagj) =
0
1 0
gh()
gl()
0
1 0
gh()
gl()
+ 1
h
1  F h (s)
i
+
1
0
1 0
gh()
gl()
+ 1
h
1  F l (s)
i
(10)
From (1), we have then that given s, A submits a project if and only if
0
1 0
gh()
gl()
0
1 0
gh()
gl()
+ 1
h
1  F h (s)
i
+
1
0
1 0
gh()
gl()
+ 1
h
1  F l (s)
i
 c()
0
1  0
gh()
gl()
nh
1  F h (s)
i
  c
o
 c 
h
1  F l (s)
i
()
0
1  0
gh()
gl()
 c 

1  F l (s)

[1  F h (s)]  c (11)
Note now that if s < 01 
 
F l
 1
(1  c) 2 (0; 1), then (11) is satised for any . To see
this, note that s < 01 implies that 1   c   F l (s) > 0, which together with F h (s) < F l (s)
implies 1   c   F h (s) > 0, and thus

1  F h (s)
   c > 0 > c   1  F l (s). Second, if
s > 
0
2 
 
F h
 1
(1  c) 2 (0; 1), then (11) is satised for no . To see this, note that s > 02
implies F h (s)  1 + c > 0, which then implies F l (s)  1 + c > 0, and thus,

1  F h (s)
  c <
0 < c   1  F l (s). Finally, note that 01 < 02. By taking the derivative of c [1 F l(s)][1 Fh(s)] c with
respect to s, since

1  F h (s)
   c > 0 and c   1  F l (s) > 0 when s 2 [01; 02], it follows
immediately that this term is increasing in s on [01; 02].
Let S  lim
!1
gh()
gl()
and S  lim
!0
gh()
gl()
, where fS; Sg  R+ [ f0;+1g. If S = 1 and S =
0, then let 1  01 and 2  02, and note that as s increases from 1 to 2,
c [1 F l(s)]
[1 Fh(s)] c
increases continuously from 0 to 1. Therefore, for any s there exists  2 [0; 1] such that g
h()
gl()
=
c [1 F l(s)]
[1 Fh(s)] c

=

0
1 0

. Assume now that S < 1 and S > 0. Let 1 be dened implicitly by
S =

c [1 F l(1)]
[1 Fh(1)] c

=

0
1 0

, and 2 be dened implicitly by S =

c [1 F l(2)]
[1 Fh(2)] c

=

0
1 0

. Note
that since lim
s!0+1
c [1 F l(s)]
[1 Fh(s)] c = 0 and lims!0 2
c [1 F l(s)]
[1 Fh(s)] c = 1, we have 1 > 
0
1 and 2 < 
0
2.
Since [01; 02]  (0; 1) and 1 < 2, it follows that [1; 2]  (0; 1). Then, when s increases from
1 to 2,

c [1 F l(s)]
[1 Fh(s)] c

=

0
1 0

increases continuously from S to S. Therefore, for any s there
exists  2 [0; 1] such that gh()
gl()
=

c [1 F l(s)]
[1 Fh(s)] c

=

0
1 0

. Finally, if S <1 and S = 0, then let
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1  01 and 2 be dened implicitly by S =

c [1 F l(2)]
[1 Fh(2)] c

=

0
1 0

, while if S =1 and S > 0,
then let 1 be dened implicitly by S =

c [1 F l(1)]
[1 Fh(1)] c

=

0
1 0

and 2  02.
(ii) For the evaluator, from (2) and (7) it follows that, given an arbitrary cuto¤ strategy s,
Pr(hjfsg; )  L
1 + L
()
Pr(fsgjh) 01 0
fh()
f l()
Pr(fsgjh) 01 0
fh()
f l()
+ Pr(fsgjl)
 L
1 + L
()

1 Gh(s)

0
1 0
fh()
f l()
[1 Gh(s)] 01 0
fh()
f l()
+ [1 Gl(s)]
 L
1 + L
()
0
1  0
fh()
f l()
1 Gh(s)
1 Gl(s)
 L. 
Appendix A3. Proof of Proposition 1
First, As best-response function  (s), as elicited from (3), is increasing because dd
h
gh()
gl()
i
> 0
and
c [1 F l(s)]
[1 Fh(s)] c is increasing in s. To show that  (s) is decreasing, since
d
d
h
fh()
f l()
i
> 0, it is
enough to show that 1 G
h(s)
1 Gl(s) is increasing in s. Taking the derivative, we have
@
@s

1 Gh(s)
1 Gl(s)

=
 gh(s)

1 Gl(s)

+ gl(s)

1 Gh(s)

[1 Gl(s)]2
> 0
To show this inequality, note that dd
h
gh()
gl()
i
> 0 implies g
h(s)
gl(s)
 gh(x)
gl(x)
for x 2 [s; 1], and thus
that gh (s) g
l (x)  gl (s) gh (x). Integrating this inequality with respect to x between s and 1,
we obtain gh (s)

1 Gl (s)
  gl (s) 1 Gh (s) which immediately proves the result.
Thus  (s), as dened implicitly by (4), is strictly decreasing. Let 3   (0) satisfying
0
1 0
fh(3)
f l(3)
= L. Then,  () decreases on [0; 1] from 3 to 0. Dene the inverse  1 : [0; 3]! [0; 1],
and note that it is decreasing and bijective on its domain. Assume rst that 3 > 1. Then
 1 (s) and  (s) must be equal at some value  2 (1; 3). Let    (), and note that
 = 
 
 1 ()

=  ( ()) =  (). Thus, we conclude that (; ) as dened is the unique
equilibrium of the game. Moreover, since  1 () is strictly decreasing on [0; 1], we must have
 2 [0; 1) and  2 (0; 1). Finally, if 1  3 then  = 0. 
10
